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In recent years, there is growing concern about corporate governance and its role
in the global economy. More and more stock exchanges and regulatory bodies
around the world establish best practice standards and regulations of corporate
governance. Investors also begin to take the systematic inspection of corporate
governance mechanism as a part of the investment decision-making process.
With development of research on corporate governance, the study of corporate
governance transfers from the specific characteristics of corporate governance to
the power structure balances and starts a quantitative evaluation stage. Building a
scientific and effective corporate governance mechanisms validity evaluation
system plays an important role on protecting the stakeholder’s interests,
effectively supervising and forming the reputation restraining mechanism of the
listed companies, and accelerating the security market development.
Through literature review on corporate governance evaluation system, this paper
first puts forward the philosophy of the value-oriented corporate governance
mechanism validity evaluation based on corporate performance, then advances
the concept of corporate governance mechanism validity evaluation, and further
develops the validity evaluation model.. It also analyzes the effective functioning
mechanism of corporate governance through equity governance, behavior
controlling governance of major shareholders, creditor's rights governance, board
governance, Managers governance, Supervisors governance and non-critical
stakeholders governance, then develops the listed company governance validity
evaluation index-CGVI index, which can reflect the comprehensive level of
corporate governance and significantly correlated with corporate performance.
Through the establishment of this scientific dynamic evaluation system, CGVI can
timely detect problems in corporate governance. Corporate governance













of corporate governance. In contrast to "static" evaluation method mostly based
on the operational procedures or the system construction of corporate
governance, corporate governance mechanisms validity evaluation is a "dynamic"
method mostly based on the characteristics of corporate governance. It has also
partially offset some defects of "static" evaluation method and has a certain
theoretical and practical significance. Firstly, it is to strengthen the validity of
corporate governance awareness and to establish an orientation of empirical
study from the "static" evaluation of governance regulation to the "dynamic"
evaluation of corporate governance mechanisms validity. Secondly, it is to
establish the theory analysis system about Company Governance Validity Index
and enrich related literature. Thirdly, investors can actively avoid investing in
ineffectively governed companies according to these research findings. Finally, it
makes possible for investors to utilize a more feasible means of real-time
monitoring of corporate governance.
The research clue is, first of all, on the basis of Corporate Governance literature
review and through systematic analyzing, corporate governance mechanism
could be separated into 7 secondary governance structures, including equity
governance, behavior controlling governance of major shareholders, creditor's
rights governance, board governance, Managers governance, Supervisors
governance and non-critical stakeholders governance and 56 tertiary independent
factor indicators. Secondly, beginning from the governance factor, we calculate
the governance structure validity evaluation indices which can reflect the common
effect of all the governance structure’s factors, called the secondary evaluation
indices, and then calculate CGVI based on the above seven secondary evaluation
indices. Finally, by studying the relationship between the indices and company
performance to verify the effectiveness of CGVI Index, and try to answer whether
the governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies run effectively or not.













theoretical analysis, based on the literature review of international and domestic
corporate governance research, we provide theoretical support for empirical
study. In empirical research, using the factor analysis to build corporate
performance evaluation index, using principal component analysis to build the
seven secondary evaluation indices and CGVI, using group testing and multiple
linear regression to analyze the effectiveness of the CGVI and its secondary
evaluation indices.
This paper is divided into seven parts:
The first part is an introduction. It describes research background, methods,
clues, innovation and the structure of papers.
The second part is the theoretical basis of corporate governance mechanism
validity evaluation. This part defines the related concepts, analyzing theoretical
basis, discussing governance guidelines, collecting and comparing the
representative corporate governance evaluation systems of the domestic
companies with those of the international companies in order to find inspiration for
the study.
The third part is corporate governance model for CGVI. This part describes the
selection principles of corporate governance element index, and proposes ideas,
of specific mathematical calculation approach and validity test method of CGVI
index, including its secondary evaluation indices.
The fourth part is company performance evaluation research. Based on the
comparative analysis of the company’s performance evaluation method, we use
the multi-factor comprehensive method of financial evaluation to build the
company operational performance evaluation index (Performance Index, referred
to as PI) to measure the company's operating performance. We also use Market
Value Added (referred to as MVA) of economic evaluation to measure the
company's market value and the market premium.













seven secondary evaluation indices, including equity governanceGISHD,
behavior controlling governance of major shareholdersGICTRL, creditor's rights
governanceGIDEBT, board governanceGIDIR, Managers governanceGIADM,
Supervisors governanceGISUP and non-critical stakeholders governanceGINCS.
It also analyses the relationship between these seven secondary evaluation
indices and Corporate Performance.
The sixth part is the CGVI and its empirical analysis. Based on the seven
secondary evaluation indices proposed on the fifth part, we construct a
comprehensive corporate governance evaluation index-CGVI, and verify its
validity.
The seventh part is the conclusion and further research suggestion. The study
has reached some interesting results, such as, designing evaluation index system
which meets the 4M principles, constructing CGVI measurement and calculation
model, analyzing the effectiveness of the seven secondary evaluation indices and
their correlation mechanism, and describing the characteristics of tertiary element
index which support the effective running of the corporate governance
mechanism of China Listed Companies. The study proves the rationality of the
value-oriented corporate governance mechanism validity evaluation based on
corporate performance, and verifies that the Chinese listed companies run an
effective governance mechanism as a whole.
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